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Abstract
Much of the literature on rational cryptography focuses on analyzing the strategic
properties of cryptographic protocols. However, due to the presence of computationally-
bounded players and the asymptotic nature of cryptographic security, a definition of
sequential rationality for this setting has thus far eluded researchers.
We propose a new framework for overcoming these obstacles, and provide the first
definitions of computational solution concepts that guarantee sequential rationality.
We argue that natural computational variants of subgame perfection are too strong for
cryptographic protocols. As an alternative, we introduce a weakening called threat-free
Nash equilibrium that is more permissive but still eliminates the undesirable “empty
threats” of non-sequential solution concepts.
To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we revisit the problem of im-
plementing a mediator for correlated equilibria (Dodis-Halevi-Rabin, Crypto’00), and
propose a variant of their protocol that is sequentially rational for a non-trivial class of
correlated equilibria. Our treatment provides a better understanding of the conditions
under which mediators in a correlated equilibrium can be replaced by a stable protocol.
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1 Introduction
A recent line of research has considered replacing the traditional cryptographic modeling of
adversaries with a game-theoretic one. Rather than assuming arbitrary malicious behavior,
participants are viewed as being self-interested, rational entities that wish to maximize their
own profit, and that would deviate from a protocol’s prescribed instructions if and only if
it is in their best interest to do so.
Such game theoretic modeling is expected to facilitate the task of protocol design, since
rational behavior may be easier to handle than malicious behavior. It also has the advantage
of being more realistic in that it does not assume that some of the parties honestly follow
the protocol’s instructions, as is frequently done in cryptography.
The interplay between cryptography and game theory can also be beneficial to the latter.
For instance, using tools from secure computation, it has been shown how to transform
games in the mediated model into games in the unmediated model.
But regardless of whether one analyzes cryptographic protocols from a game theoretic
perspective or whether one uses protocols to enhance game theory, it is clear that the results
are meaningful only if one provides an adequate framework for such analyses.
1.1 Computational Nash Equilibrium
Applying game-theoretic reasoning in a cryptographic context consists of modeling inter-
action as a game, and designing a protocol that is in equilibrium. The game specifies the
model of interaction, as well as the utilities of the various players as a function of the game’s
outcome. The protocol lays out a specific plan of action for each player, with the goal of
realizing some pre-specified task. Once a protocol has been shown to be in equilibrium,
rational players are expected to follow it, thus reaching the desired outcome.
A key difficulty in applying game-theoretic reasoning to the analysis of cryptographic
protocols stems from the latter’s use of computational infeasibility. Whereas game theory
places no bounds on the computational ability of players, in cryptography it is typically
assumed that players are computationally bounded. Thus, in order to retain the mean-
ingfulness of cryptographic protocols, it is imperative to restrict the set of strategies that
are available to protocol participants. This gives rise to a natural analog of Nash equi-
librium (NE), referred to as computational Nash equilibrium (CNE): any polynomial-time
computable deviation of a player from the specified protocol can improve her utility by only
a negligible amount (assuming other players stick to the prescribed strategy).
Consider, for example, the following (two-stage, zero-sum) game (related to a game
studied by Ben-Sasson et al. [4] and Fortnow and Santhanam [7]), which postulates the
existence of a one-way permutation f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}n.
Example 1.1 (One-way permutation game):
1. P1 chooses some x ∈ {0, 1}
n, and sends f(x).
2. P2 sends a message z ∈ {0, 1}
n.
3. P2 wins (gets payoff 1) if z = x (and gets -1 otherwise).
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In classical game theory, in all NE of this game P2 wins, since there always exists some
z such that z = x. However, in the computational setting, the following is a CNE: both
players choose their messages uniformly at random (resulting in an expected loss for P2).
This is true because if P2 chooses z at random, then P1 can never improve his payoff by
not choosing at random. If P1 chooses x at random, then by the definition of a one-way
permutation, any computationally-bounded strategy σ2 of P2 will be able to guess the value
of x with at most negligible (in n) probability. Thus, the expected utility of P2 using σ2 is
negligible, and so he loses at most that much by sticking to his CNE strategy (i.e. picking
some z at random).
1.2 Computational Subgame Perfection
The notion of CNE serves as a first stepping stone towards a game-theoretic treatment of
cryptographic protocols. However, protocols are typically interactive, and CNE does not
take their sequential nature into consideration.
In traditional game theory interaction is modeled via extensive games. The most ba-
sic equilibrium notion in this setting is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which requires
players’ strategies to be in NE at any point of the interaction, regardless of the history of
prior actions taken by other players. Basically, this ensures that players will not reconsider
their actions as a result of reaching certain histories (a.k.a. “empty threats”).
As already noted in previous works (cf. [16, 19, 26]), it is not at all clear how to adapt
SPE to the computational setting. A natural approach would be to require the strategies
to be CNE at every possible history. However, if we condition on the history, then this
means that different machines can and will do much better than the prescribed equilibrium
strategy. For example, in the one-way permutation game of Example 1.1, given any message
history, a machine M can simply have the correct inverse hardwired.
Although this requirement can be relaxed to ask that the prescribed strategy should be
better than any other fixed machine on all inputs, this again may be too strong, since a fixed
machine can always do better on some histories. Therefore, it seems that we must accept
the following: for any machine M , with high probability over possible message histories, the
prescribed strategy does at least as well as M . However, it turns out that this approach
also fails to capture our intuitive understanding of a computational SPE (CSPE). Consider
the following (two-stage) variant of the one-way permutation game from Example 1.1:
Example 1.2 (Modified one-way permutation game):
1. P1 chooses some x ∈ {0, 1}
n, and sends f(x).
2. P2 sends a message z ∈ {0, 1}
n.
3. If exactly one of P1 and P2 send message 0, both players get payoff −2. If both players
send message 0, both players get payoff +2. Otherwise, P2 wins (with payoff +1) if
and only if z = x, and the non-winning player loses (with payoff −1).
Using a similar argument to the one applied in Section 1.1, it can be shown that the
strategies in which both players choose a message uniformly at random from {0, 1}n \ {0}
satisfy the above “probabilistic” variant of CSPE. However, this equilibrium does not match
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our intuitive understanding of SPE: P1 will prefer to send message 0 regardless of P2’s
strategy, knowing that P2 will then respond with 0 as well. The threat of playing uniformly
from all other messages is empty, and hence should not be admitted by the definition.1
The examples above are rather simple, so it is reasonable to expect that issues arising in
their analyses are inherent in many other cryptographic protocols. This raises the question
of whether a computational variant of SPE is at all attainable in a cryptographic setting.
At the heart of this question is the fact that essentially any cryptographic protocol
carries some small (but positive) probability of being broken. This means that, while there
may be a polynomial-time TM that can “perform well” on the average message history,
there is no single TM that will do better than all other TMs on every history (as for any
history there exists some TM that has the corresponding “secret information” hardwired).
This state of affairs calls for an alternative approach. While such an approach should
be meaningful enough to express strategic considerations in an interactive setting, it should
also be sufficiently weak to be realizable. As demonstrated above, any approach for tackling
this challenge should explicitly address the associated probability of error. It should also
take asymptotics into consideration.
2 Our Results
We propose a new framework for guaranteeing sequential rationality in a computational
setting. Our starting point is a weakening of subgame perfection, called threat-free Nash
equilibrium, that is more permissive, but still eliminates the undesirable empty threats of
non-sequential solution concepts.
To cast our new solution concept into the computational setting, we develop a methodol-
ogy that enables us to “translate” arguments that involve computational infeasibility into a
purely game theoretic language. This translation enables us to argue about game theoretic
concepts directly, abstracting away complications that are related to computation.
In order to demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we revisit the problem
of implementing a mediator for correlated equilibria [6], and propose a protocol that is se-
quentially rational for a non-trivial class of correlated equilibria (see Section 2.3 for details).
Our treatment provides a better understanding of the conditions under which mediators in
a correlated equilibrium can be replaced by a stable protocol.
2.1 Threat-Free Nash Equilibria
We introduce threat-free Nash equilibria (TFNE), a weakening of subgame perfection whose
objective is to capture strategic considerations in an interactive setting. Loosely speaking,
a pair of strategies in an extensive game is a TFNE if it is a NE, and if in addition no player
is facing an empty threat at any history.
The problem of empty threats is the following: in a NE of an extensive game, it is
possible that a player plays sub-optimally at a history that is reached with probability 0.
The other player may strategically choose to deviate from his prescribed strategy and arrive
at that history, knowing that this will cause the first player to play an optimal response
1We note that a simple change to the payoffs yields a game whose empty threat is more “typical”: For
the case in which both players send message 0, let P2’s payoff be −3/2.
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rather than the prescribed one. In an SPE this problem is eliminated by requiring that
no player can play sub-optimally at any history, and so no other player will strategically
deviate and take advantage of this.
The main observation leading to the definition of TFNE is that the above requirement
may be too strong a condition to eliminate such instability: if an optimal response of a player
decreases the utility of the other, then this other player would not want to strategically
deviate. By explicitly ruling out this possibility, the instability caused by empty threats is
eliminated, despite the equilibrium notion being more permissive than subgame perfection.
To make this precise, we give the first formal definition of an empty threat in extensive
games. The definition is regressive: Roughly speaking, a player i is facing a threat at a
history if there is some deviation at that history, along with a threat-free continuation from
that history onwards, so that i increases his overall expected payoff when the players play
this new deviation and continuation.
We note that the notion of TFNE is strong enough to eliminate the undesirable strategy
of playing randomly in the modified OWP game from Example 1.2 – Claim 5.13 shows that
in any computational TFNE of this game the second player outputs 0 after history 0.
2.2 Strategy-Filters and Tractable Strategies
To cast the definition of TFNE into a computational setting, we map the given protocol
into a sequence of extensive games using strategy-filters that map computable strategies into
their “strategic representation” (the strategic representation corresponds to the strategy
effectively played by a given interactive Turing machine). We can then apply pure game
theoretic solution concepts, and in particular our newly introduced concept of TFNE, to
understand the strategic behavior of players.
Similarly to the definition of CNE, the computational treatment departs from the tra-
ditional game theoretic treatment in two crucial ways. First of all, our definition is framed
asymptotically (in order to capture computational infeasibility), whereas traditional game-
theory is framed for finitely sized games. Second, it allows for a certain error probability.
This is an artifact of the (typically negligible) probability with which the security of essen-
tially any cryptographic scheme can be broken.
Given a cryptographic protocol, we consider a corresponding sequence of extensive
games. The sequence is indexed by a security parameter k and an error parameter ε.
For each game, we “constrain” the strategies available to players to be a subset of those
that can be generated by PPT players in the protocol. Intuitively, the game indexed by
(k, ε) contains those strategies that run in time polynomial in k and “break crypto” with
probability at most ε. We also require that strategy-filters be PPT-covering: that for any
polynomially-small ε, every PPT is eventually a legal strategy, far enough into the sequence
of extensive games.
Using this framework we formalize the notion of a computational threat-free Nash equi-
librium (CTFNE). To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt at analyzing
sequential strategic reasoning in the presence of computational infeasibility.
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2.3 Applications
Our treatment provides a powerful tool for arguing about the strategic behavior of players
in a cryptographic protocol. It also enables us to isolate sequential strategic considerations
that are suitable for use in cryptographic protocols (so that the solution concept is not too
weak and not too strong).
As a warm up, we demonstrate the applicability of our framework and solution concept
to the “coin-flipping game” that corresponds to Blum’s coin-flipping protocol [5]. One
may view this as playing the classic game of match pennies without simultaneity (but with
cryptography). We show that it is possible to exploit the specific structure of the game to
implement a correlating device resulting in a CTFNE. This is in contrast to the general
approach of [6] that only enables one to argue CNE. This result already demonstrates the
added strength of our framework and definition.
We then revisit the general problem of implementing a mediator for correlated equi-
libria [6], and propose a protocol that is sequentially rational for a non-trivial class of
correlated equilibria. In particular, our protocol is in a CTFNE for correlated equilibria
that are convex combinations of Nash equilibria and that are “undominated”: There does
not exist any convex combination of Nash equilibria for which both players get a strictly
higher expected payoff.
Our treatment explores the conditions under which mediators in a correlated equilibrium
can be replaced by a stable protocol, and sheds light on some structural properties of such
equilibria.
Finally, we prove a general theorem that identifies sufficient conditions for a TFNE in
extensive games. Namely, we show that if an undominated NE has the additional property
that no player can harm the other by a unilateral deviation, then that NE must also be
threat-free.
2.4 Related Work
This paper contributes to the growing literature on rational cryptography. Many of the
papers in this line of research, such as [6, 13, 15, 1, 9, 20, 22, 16, 18, 19, 17, 26, 23, 2, 10],
explore various solution concepts for cryptographic protocols viewed as games (often in
the context of rational secret-sharing). Aside from the works of Lepinski et al. [15, 20],
Ong et al. [26], and Gradwohl [10], who work in a different model2, all prior literature has
considered solution concepts that are non-sequential. More specifically, they all use variants
of NE such as strict NE, NE with stability to trembles, and everlasting equilibrium.
An additional related work is that of Halpern and Pass [14], in which the authors
present a general framework for game theory in a setting with computational cost. While
their approach to computational limitations is more general than ours, they only address
NE. Finally, Fortnow and Santhanam [7] study a different framework for games with com-
putational limits, but also only in the context of NE.
2More specifically, [15, 20] make strong physical assumptions, [26] assume the existence of a fraction of
honest (non-rational) players, and [26, 10] work in an information-theoretic setting.
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2.5 Future Work
One potential application of our new definition is an analysis of rational secret-sharing
protocols. While the design of such a protocol that is in a CTFNE is not within the
scope of the current paper, we do provide some intuition about why known gradual release
protocols satisfy a slightly weaker solution concept. Consider the following simple setting:
each of two players knows a bit, and the XOR of the two bits is the secret. Secret exchange
protocols, for example [21], allow the players to exchange their respective bits and thus
learn the secret in such a way that even if one of the players cheats, he can reconstruct the
secret with probability at most ε more than the other player. Then under the assumptions
on players’ utilities used by [17], any unilateral deviation from this protocol can get the
deviating player an increase of only O(ε) in utility. However, since the other player can
always correctly guess the secret with almost the same probability (up to the additive ε),
the potential benefit to a player of deviating, causing the other to deviate, and so on,
is also at most O(ε). Thus, this protocol is in a computational variant of ε-NE and is
also ε-threat-free. The reason this is weaker than our current solution concept is that we
require the benefit from a threat or a deviation to be negligible, whereas in [21] the ε is
polynomially-small (in the number of rounds of the protocol).
There are numerous other compelling problems left for future work. The first problem is
to extend our definition to games with simultaneous moves. While we do offer a partial ex-
tension tailored to the problem of implementing a mediator, the problem of defining CTFNE
for general games with simultaneous moves is open. Such a definition would be particularly
useful for a sequential analysis of protocols with a simultaneous channel. Another natural
extension of the definition is to multiple players, as opposed to 2. Such an extension comes
with its own challenges, particularly with regard to the possibility of collusion. A third
extension is to incorporate the threat-freeness property with stronger variants of NE, such
as stability with respect to trembles, strict NE, or survival of iterated elimination of dom-
inated strategies. Finally, we would like to find more applications for our definition. One
particularly interesting problem is to extend our results on the implementation of mediators
to a larger class of correlated equilibria.
3 Game Theory Definitions
3.1 Extensive Games
Informally, a game in extensive form can be described as a game tree in which each node is
owned by some player and edges are labeled by legal actions. The game begins at the root,
and at each step follows the edge labeled by the action chosen by the current node’s owner.
Utilities of players are given at the leaves of the tree. More formally, we have the following
standard definition of extensive games (see, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein [27]):
Definition 3.1 (Extensive game) A 2-person extensive game is a tuple Γ = (H,P,A, u)
where
• H is a set of (finite) history sequences such that the empty word ǫ ∈ H. A history
h ∈ H is terminal if {a : (h, a) ∈ H} = ∅. The set of terminal histories is denoted
Z.
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• P : (H \Z)→ {1, 2} is a function that assigns a “next” player to every non-terminal
history.
• A is a function that, for every non-terminal history h ∈ H \ Z, assigns a finite set
A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H} of available actions to player P (h).
• u = (u1, u2) is a pair of payoff functions ui : Z 7→ R.
We will denote the two players by P1 and P2 and by Pi and P−i, where i ∈ {1, 2} and
−i is shorthand for 2− i.
Definition 3.2 (Behavioral strategy) Behavioral strategies of players in an extensive
game are collections σi = (σi(h))h:P (h)=i of independent probability measures, where σi(h)
is a probability measure over A(h).
For any extensive game Γ = (H,P,A, u), any player i, and any history h satisfying
P (h) = i, we denote by Σi(h) the set of all probability measures over A(h). We denote by
Σi the set of all strategies σi of player i in Γ. For each profile σ = (σ1, σ2) of strategies,
define the outcome O(σ) to be the probability distribution over terminal histories that
results when each player i follows strategy σi. Note that if both σ1 and σ2 are deterministic
(i.e. deterministic on every history), then so is the outcome O(σ).
3.2 Nash Equilibrium
Each profile of strategies yields a distribution over outcomes, and we are interested in
profiles that guarantee the players some sort of optimal outcomes. There are many solution
concepts that capture various meanings of “optimal,” and one of the most basic is the Nash
equilibrium (NE).
Definition 3.3 (Nash equilibrium (NE)) An ε-Nash equilibrium of an extensive game
Γ = (H,P,A, u) is a profile σ∗ of strategies such that for each player i,
E [ui (O(σ
∗))] ≥ E
[
ui
(
O(σ∗−i, σi)
)]
− ε
for every strategy σi of player i. It is a NE if the above holds for ε ≤ 0 and a strict NE if
it holds for some ε < 0.
One of the premises behind the stability of profiles that are in an ε-NE is that players
will not bother to deviate for a mere gain of ε. For applications in cryptography we will
generally have ε be some negligible function, and this corresponds to our understanding
that we do not care about negligible gains.
3.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
One of the problems with NE in extensive games is the presence of empty threats: a player’s
equilibrium strategy may specify a sub-optimal strategy at a history that is reached with
probability 0. The other player, knowing this, may strategically deviate to reach that
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history, predicting that the first player will also deviate. For more details and explicit
examples see any textbook on game theory, such as [27].
The most basic solution to the problem of empty threats is to refine the NE solution,
and require a strategy profile to be in a NE at every history in the game. This results in a
profile that is in subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
Definition 3.4 (Subgames of extensive game) For any 2-person extensive game Γ =
(H,P,A, u) and any non-terminal history h ∈ H, the subgame Γ|h is the 2-person extensive
game Γ|h = (H|h, P |h, A|h, u|h), where
• h′ ∈ H|h if and only if h ◦ h
′ ∈ H,
• P |h(h
′) = P (h ◦ h′),
• A|h(h
′) = A(h ◦ h′), and
• ui|h(h
′) = ui(h ◦ h
′).
For each profile σ = (σ1, σ2) of strategies and history h ∈ H, define the conditional
outcome O(σ)|h to be the probability distribution over terminal histories that results when
the game starts at a history h, and from that point onwards each player i follows strategy
σi.
Definition 3.5 (Subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)) An ε-subgame perfect equilib-
rium of an extensive game Γ = (H,P,A, u) is a profile σ∗ of strategies such that for each
player i and each non-terminal history h ∈ H,
E [ui (O(σ
∗)|h)] ≥ E
[
ui
(
O(σ∗−i, σi)|h
)]
− ε
for every strategy σi of player i. It is an SPE if the above holds for ε = 0 and a strict SPE
if it holds for some ε < 0.
3.4 Constrained Games
In the standard game theory literature, where there are no computational constraints on
the players, the available strategies σi of player i are all possible collections (σi(h))h:P (h)=i,
where σi(h) is an arbitrary distribution over A(h). In our setting, however, we will only
consider strategies that can be implemented by computationally bounded ITMs. This re-
quires being able to constrain players’ strategies to a strict subset of the possible strategies.
One natural way to restrict the strategies is to allow only a subset of all distributions over
A(h) at each history h. However, this does not enable us to capture more elaborate restric-
tions, and specifically ones that might result from requiring strategies to be implementable
by polynomial time ITMs. (For example, a player might have for every possible history a
strategy that plays best response on that history, but no strategy that plays best response
on all histories.) To capture these more elaborate restrictions, we consider player i strategies
that are restricted to an arbitrary subset Ti of all possible (mixed) strategies.
Given a pair T = (T1, T2) of such sets we can then define a constrained version of a
game, in which only strategies that belong to these sets are considered.
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Definition 3.6 (Constrained game) Let Γ = (H,P,A, u) be an extensive game and let
T = (T1, T2), where Ti ⊆
⊗
h:P (h)=iΣi(h) for each i ∈ {1, 2}. The T -constrained version of
Γ is the game in which the only allowed strategies for player i belong to Ti.
NE of constrained games are defined similarly to regular NE, except that players’ strate-
gies and deviations must be from the constraint sets.
Definition 3.7 (NE in constrained games) An ε-Nash equilibrium of a (T1, T2)-constrained
version of an extensive game Γ = (H,P,A, u) is a profile σ∗ ∈ (T1, T2) of strategies such
that for each player i,
E [ui (O(σ
∗))] ≥ E
[
ui
(
O(σ∗−i, σi)
)]
− ε
for every strategy σi ∈ Ti of player i. It is a NE if the above holds for ε ≤ 0 and a strict
NE if it holds for some ε < 0.
4 Threat-Free Nash Equilibrium
Our starting point is the inadequacy of subgame perfection in capturing sequential ratio-
nality in a computational context. As argued in Section 1.2, it is unreasonable to require
computationally-bounded players to play optimally at every node of a game. In particu-
lar, in cryptographic settings this requires breaking the security of the protocol, which is
assumed impossible under the computational constraints.
A possible idea might be to require that players “play optimally at every node of the
game, under their computational constraints.” However, this idea cannot be interpreted in
a sensible way. Computational constraints must be defined “globally,” and thus the notion
of playing optimally under some computational constraint on a particular history is sense-
less. In particular, for any history of some cryptographic protocol, there is a small machine
that plays optimally on this specific history unconditionally (and breaks “cryptographic
challenges” appearing in this history, by having the solutions hardwired). This machine is
efficient, and so meets essentially any computational constraint. So, while under compu-
tational constraints every machine fails on cryptographic challenges in most histories, for
every history there is a machine that succeeds. We thus assume that a player chooses his
machine before the game starts, and cannot change his machine later.
4.1 A New Solution Concept
In light of the above discussion, it seems like the solution concept we are looking for has to
reconcile the following seemingly conflicting properties:
1. It implies an optimal strategy for the players under their computational constraints,
which implies non-optimal play on certain histories.
2. It does not allow empty threats, thus implying “sequential rationality.”
The crucial observation behind our definition is that in order to rule out empty threats,
one does not necessarily need to require that players play optimally at every node, be-
cause not every non-optimal play carries a threat to other players. In fact, in a typical
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cryptographic protocol, the security of each player is building on other players not playing
optimally (because playing optimally would mean breaking the security of the protocol).
Thus, a player’s “declaration” to play non-optimally does not necessarily carry a threat: the
other players may even gain from it. More generally, even in non-cryptographic protocols,
at least in 2-player perfect information games, we can use the following observation: in any
computational challenge, either a player gains from the other not playing optimally, or, if he
does not gain, he can avoid introducing that computational challenge to the other player.3
Following the above observation, we introduce a new solution concept for extensive
games. The new solution concept requires that players be in NE, and moreover, that no
player impose an empty threat on the other. At the same time, it does not require players to
play optimally at every node. In other words, players may (declare to) play non-optimally
on non-equilibrium support, yet this declaration of non-optimal play does not carry an
empty threat. We call our new solution concept TFNE, for threat-free Nash equilibrium.
To make the above precise, we introduce a formal definition of an empty threat. An
empty threat occurs when a player threatens to play “non-rationally” on some history in
order to coerce the other player to avoid this history. Crucially, empty threats are such
that, had the threatened not believed the threat, had he deviated accordingly, and had the
threatening player played “rationally,” the threatened player would have benefitted. To
rephrase our intuition: a player faces an empty threat with respect to some strategy profile
if by deviating from his prescribed strategy, and having the other player react “rationally,”
he improves his payoff (in comparison with sticking to the prescribed strategy and having
the other player react “rationally” from then on).
But what does it mean for the other player to react “rationally”? The other player may
assume, recursively, that the first player will play a best response, and will not carry out
empty threats against him, and so on, leading to a regressive definition.
4.2 Vanilla Version
Before giving the general definition of TFNE that we will use, we present a simpler version
that has no slackness parameter and that works for games without constrained strategies.
For a player i and a history h, two strategies σi and πi are equivalent for player i on
h if P (h) = i and σi(h) = πi(h), or P (h) 6= i. Two strategies differ only on the subgame
h if they are equivalent on every non-terminal history that does not have h as a prefix.
Formally, they are equivalent on every history in H \ {h′ ∈ H : h′ = h ◦ h′′ for some h′′}.
For a history h ∈ H, a strategy σ, and a distribution τ = τ(h) on A(h), let
Cont(h, σ, τ)
def
=
{
π : (π differs from σ only on the subgame h) & (π(h) = τ(h))
}
.
We now proceed to define a threat. For simplicity, we will do so for generic games, in which
each player’s possible payoffs are distinct. For such games, the set Cont(h, σ, τ) always
contains exactly one “threat-free” element (defined below).
3This is indeed an informal statement. In fact, we should add the disclaimer that computational hardness
for one player does not necessarily have to stem from the strategy of the other. For example, the utility
function may be computationally hard.
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Definition 4.1 (Threat) Let Γ = (H,P,A, u) be an extensive game with distinct payoffs.
Let σ be a strategy profile, and let h ∈ H. Player i = P (h) is facing a threat at history
h with respect to σ if there exists a distribution τ = τ(h) over A(h) such that the unique
π ∈ Cont(h, σ, τ) and π′ ∈ Cont(h, σ, σ) that are threat-free on h satisfy
E [ui (O(π))] > E
[
ui
(
O(π′)
)]
,
where strategy π is threat-free on h if for all h′ 6= ǫ satisfying h ◦ h′ ∈ H player P (h ◦ h′) is
not facing a threat at h ◦ h′ with respect to π.
Note that if h is such that for all a ∈ A(h) it holds that h ◦ a ∈ Z, then any profile π is
threat free on h.
Definition 4.2 (Threat-free Nash equilibrium) Let Γ = (H,P,A, u) be an extensive
game. A strategy profile σ∗ is a threat-free Nash equilibrium (TFNE) if:
1. σ∗ is a NE of Γ, and
2. for any h ∈ H, player P (h) is not facing a threat at history h with respect to σ∗.
Note that in every profile that is in a TFNE, the effective play matches some SPE
profile (more precisely, there is an SPE profile that yields exactly the same distribution on
outcomes). This and other properties of threats and TFNE are formalized in the companion
paper to this work [11].
In the definition of a threat we used the fact that Cont(h, σ, τ) and Cont(h, σ, σ) each
contain exactly one profile that is threat-free on h. To show that this must be the case, we
have the following proposition, which is not unlike the fact that generic games have unique
subgame perfect equilibria.
Proposition 4.3 For any extensive game Γ = (H,P,A, u), strategy profile σ, player i,
history h ∈ H \ Z with P (h) = i, and distribution τ over A(h), the set Cont(h, σ, τ)
contains exactly one profile that is threat-free on h.
Proof: For any history h ∈ H \ Z, let height(h) be the maximal distance between h and
a descendant of h (i.e. the leaf that is furthest away from h but lies on the subtree rooted
by h). The proof of the proposition is by induction on height(h).
For the base case height(h) = 1, note that there is exactly one element in Cont(h, σ, τ)
and that this profile is threat-free on h (since h is a last move of the game).
Next, suppose the claim of the proposition holds for all histories h with height(h) < k.
We will prove that it holds for histories h with height(h) = k. To this end, fix such a
history h0, and suppose the children of h0 in the game tree are h1, . . . , ht. Suppose also
that P (h0) = i and P (h1) = . . . = P (ht) = −i, and note that this is without loss of
generality.
Consider the profile π0 that is identical to σ except at history h, and fix π0(h) = τ(h).
We now repeat the following process in succession for each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}: For any such j,
let
TF(hj)
def
=
{
π ∈
⋃
τ j
Cont(hj , πj−1, τ j) : π is threat-free on hj
}
.
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We then choose a profile πj ∈ TF(hj) that satisfies
u−i
(
πj
)
≥ u−i
(
π′′
)
for all π′′ ∈ TF(hj). Because payoffs for player −i are distinct, it must be the case that
there exists a unique maximal πj. That is, there can be no π′′ that is different from πj and
has the same payoff for player −i.
After doing this for all hj ∈ {h1, . . . , ht} we have a profile πt that we claim is threat-free
on h. To see this, observe that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, πj is threat-free on hj because we
chose it to be a threat-free profile from Cont(hj , πj−1, τ ′′). However, since for each j we
chose a maximal τ j , there are no threats at the histories hj either. Finally, uniqueness of
πj is guaranteed by the fact that for each j, our choice of a maximal τ j was unique.
4.3 Round-Parameterized Version
For games induced by cryptographic protocols we will need a more general definition of
TFNE. We assume that in these games players alternate moves, and thus there is a natural
notion of the “rounds” in the game: Player i makes a move in round 1, then player −i
makes a move in round 2, and so on until the end of the game.
For the general definition, we introduce a few modifications to the vanilla version:
• We add a slackness parameter ε. This is necessary for our applications in order to
handle the probability of error inherent in almost all cryptographic protocols.
• We allow players to be threatened at rounds, rather than just specific histories. This
is needed because when we add the slackness parameter, a player might be threatened
at a set of histories, where the weight of each individual threat does not exceed the
slackness parameter, but the overall weight does.
• Finally, for a player to be threatened, we require that he improve on all threat-free
continuations π. The reason we need this is that in the general case, there may be
more than one π that is threat-free. If a player deviates from his prescribed behavior,
he cannot choose which (threat-free) continuation will be played.
The definitions below make use of the notion of a round R strategy of player i: This
is simply a function mapping every history h that reaches round R to a distribution over
A(h). For a round R ∈ N we let σi(R) represent player i’s round R strategy implied by σ.
Let σ(R) = (σ1(R), σ2(R)), and let
Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R))
def
=
{
π ∈ T : π(S) = σ(S) ∀S ≤ R
}
,
where T = (T1, T2) consists of constraints for players’ strategies.
Definition 4.4 (ε-threat) Let Γ = (H,P,A, u) be an extensive game with constraints
T = (T1, T2). Let ε ≥ 0, let σ ∈ T be a strategy profile, and let R ∈ N be a round of Γ.
Player i = P (R) is facing an ε-threat at round R with respect to σ if there exists a round
R strategy τ = τ(R) for player i such that
13
(i) the set Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R−1), τ(R)) is nonempty, and
(ii) for all π ∈ Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R−1), τ(R)) and π′ ∈ Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R)) that are
ε-threat-free on R
E [ui (O(π))] > E
[
ui
(
O(π′)
)]
+ ε,
where strategy π is ε-threat-free on R if for all rounds S > R it holds that player P (S) is
not facing an ε-threat at round S with respect to π.
Note that if R is the last round of the game, then any profile π ∈ T is ε-threat-free on R.
Using Definition 4.4, we can now define an ε-TFNE.
Definition 4.5 (ε-threat-free Nash equilibrium) Let Γ = (H,P,A, u) be an extensive
game with constraints T = (T1, T2). A strategy profile σ
∗ ∈ T is an ε-threat-free Nash
equilibrium (ε-TFNE) if:
1. σ∗ is an ε-NE of Γ, and
2. for any round R of Γ, player P (R) is not facing an ε-threat at round R with respect
to σ∗.
As is the case for Definition 4.1, Definition 4.4 (and hence Definition 4.5) would not
be (semantically) well-defined if either one of the sets Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R−1), τ(R)) or
Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R)) would not contain at least one profile π that is ε-threat-free on R.
The following proposition shows that this can never be the case.
Proposition 4.6 Let Γ = (H,P,A, u) be an extensive game with constraints T = (T1, T2).
Let ε ≥ 0, let σ ∈ T be a strategy profile, and let R be a round of Γ. For any round R
strategy τ = τ(R) for player i = P (R), if the set Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R−1), τ(R)) is nonempty
then it contains at least one profile π that is ε-threat-free on R.
Proof: For any round R of Γ, let height(R) be the distance between h and the last round
of Γ. The proof of the proposition is by induction on height(R).
For the base case height(R) = 0, note that, by the hypothesis of the proposition, the
set Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R−1), τ(R)) is nonempty. Since R is the last round of the game,
the set contains exactly one profile, (σ(1), . . . , σ(R−1), τ(R)), and this profile is vacuously
ε-threat-free on R.
Next, suppose the claim of the proposition holds for all rounds R with height(R) < k.
We will prove that it holds for round R satisfying height(R) = k. Let i = P (R), and
assume that there exists some π′ ∈ Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R−1), τ(R)). We would like to show
that Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R−1), τ(R)) contains at least one profile π that is ε-threat-free on R.
By the inductive hypothesis we have that, for any round R+1 strategy τ ′ of player −i,
if the set Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R − 1), τ(R), τ ′(R + 1)) is nonempty then it contains at least
one profile that is ε-threat-free on R+1 (since height(R+1) < k). We will choose a profile
that has a maximal τ ′ as follows. Let
TF(R+ 1)
def
=
{
π ∈
⋃
τ ′
Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R − 1), τ(R), τ ′(R+ 1)) : π is ε-threat-free on R+ 1
}
,
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and note that TF(R + 1) must be nonempty. This is because there always exists at least
one τ ′ for which Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R − 1), τ(R), τ ′(R + 1)) is nonempty: namely, we could
have τ ′(R + 1) = π′(R + 1). Since Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R − 1), τ(R), π′(R + 1)) is nonempty
by assumption, it must contain a profile that is ε-threat-free on R + 1 (by the inductive
hypothesis).
We now choose a profile π ∈ TF(R + 1) that satisfies
u−i (π) ≥ u−i
(
π′′
)
− ε
for all π′′ ∈ TF(R + 1). So now we have a profile π ∈ Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R−1), τ(R)), which
we claim is ε-threat-free on round R. To see this, note that π is ε-threat-free on R + 1
by the way we chose it (i.e. a profile from Cont(σ(1), . . . , σ(R− 1), τ(R), τ ′(R+ 1)) that is
ε-threat-free on R+1). However, since we chose a maximal τ ′ (up to ε), there is no ε-threat
at round R+ 1 either. Thus π is ε-threat-free on R.
5 The Computational Setting
In the following we explain how to use the notion of TFNE for cryptographic protocols. In
Section 5.1 we describe how to view a cryptographic protocol as a sequence of extensive
games. In Section 5.2 we show how to translate the behavior of an interactive TM to a
sequence of strategies. In Section 5.3 we show how to express computational hardness in
a game-theoretic setting. Finally, in Section 5.4 we give our definition of computational
TFNE.
5.1 Protocols as Sequences of Games
When placing cryptographic protocols in the framework of extensive games, the possible
messages of players in a protocol correspond to the available actions in the game tree, and
the prescribed instructions correspond to a strategy in the game.
The protocol is parameterized by a security parameter k ∈ N. The set of possible
messages in the protocol, as well as its prescribed instructions, typically depend on this k.
Assigning for each k and each party a payoff for every outcome, a protocol naturally induces
a sequence Γ(k) = (H(k), P (k), A(k), u(k)) of extensive games, where:
• H(k) is the set of possible transcripts of the protocol (sequences of messages exchanged
between the parties). A history h ∈ H(k) is terminal if the prescribed instructions of
the protocol instruct the player whose turn it is to play next to halt on input h.
• P (k) : (H(k) \ Z(k)) → {1, 2} is a function that assigns a “next” player to every
non-terminal history.
• A(k) is a function that assigns to every non-terminal history h ∈ H(k) \ Z(k) a set
A(k)(h) = {m : (h ◦m) ∈ H(k)} of possible protocol messages to player P (k)(h).4
• u(k) = (u
(k)
1 , u
(k)
2 ) is a vector of payoff functions u
(k)
i : Z
(k) → R.
4We can interpret “disallowed” messages in the protocol as abort, and define “abort” as a possible protocol
message. This will imply that every execution of the protocol corresponds to some history in the game.
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A sequence Γ = {Γ(k)}k∈N of games defined as above is referred to as a computational game.
Remark 5.1 In the following we will consider games played by Turing machines. Thus,
actions will be represented by strings. As opposed to traditional game theory, where players
are computationally unbounded, in our case the names of the actions will be significant.
For example, in the One-way Permutation Game, if we encode player 1’s action f(x) by
the string x for every x ∈ {0, 1}k , then inverting the one-way permutation becomes easy for
player 2. However, to avoid too much notation, we will identify actions with their string
representation. The reader should keep in mind, however, that actions are always strings,
and that changing the string representation of actions might be with loss of generality.
5.2 Strategic Representation of Interactive Machines
Protocols are defined in terms of interactive Turing machines (ITMs) – see [8] for a formal
definition. More specifically, the prescribed behavior for each player is defined via an ITM,
and any possible deviation of this player corresponds to choosing a different ITM. In order
to argue about the protocol in a game-theoretic manner we formalize, using game-theoretic
notions, the strategic behavior implied by ITMs. We believe this formalization is necessary
for our treatment or any game-theoretic analysis of ITMs, in particular because, to the best
of our knowledge, it has never been done before. However, because this section somewhat
departs from the main thrust of the paper, the reader may skip to Section 5.3, keeping
the following (informally stated) conclusion in mind: The strategic behavior of an ITM for
player i in a protocol may be seen as a collection of independent distributions on actions,
one for each of player i’s histories that are reached with positive probability given the ITM
of player i and some strategy profile of the other players. We refer to this collection as the
behavioral reduced strategy induced by the ITM.
When considering some computational game Γ(k) in a sequence Γ = {Γ(k)}k∈N and an
ITM “playing” this game (with input 1k), the machine does not, strictly speaking, define
a strategy. Informally, the machine specifies how to play only on histories that are not
inconsistent with the specification on earlier histories in the game. That is, an ITM for
player i specifies distributions on actions for all histories on which it is player i’s turn,
except those it cannot reach based on its own specification on earlier histories. This is the
case, because when fixing the other player’s moves, the distribution on actions the machine
plays on a history that cannot be reached is simply undefined, as we are conditioning on
an event with probability 0. In the following, we show that the prescribed behavior of an
ITM can be seen as a convex combination of reduced strategies (which we call mixed reduced
strategy), to be defined next. We then define the natural analogue of behavioral reduced
strategy, and argue that for every mixed reduced strategy there exists a behavioral reduced
strategy that is outcome-equivalent. We will eventually use behavioral reduced strategies
to describe the behavior induced by ITMs.
Definition 5.2 (Reduced strategy (adapted from [27])) Given a game Γ = (H,P,A, u),
a (pure) reduced strategy for player i is a function σi whose domain is a subset of {h ∈
H|P (h) = i} with the following properties:
• For every h in the domain of σi it holds that σi(h) ∈ A(h).
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• h = (a1, . . . , am) is in the domain of σi if and only if for any 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m− 1 such that
P (a1, . . . , aℓ) = i it holds that (a1, . . . , aℓ) is in the domain of σi and σi(a1, . . . , aℓ) =
aℓ+1.
Definition 5.3 (Mixed reduced strategy) A mixed reduced strategy for player i is a
distribution over reduced strategies for player i.
Given an ITM for Γ(k), for every instance of internal randomness for that machine (i.e.,
a vector of coins), the induced behavior of that ITM is exactly a reduced strategy. This is
the case because for every profile of pure strategies (or reduced pure strategies) of the other
players, the randomness naturally defines an action for every history that is consistent with
its previous actions (the sequence of these actions, together with the profile, defines the
outcome of the game), and on the other hand, naturally the randomness does not define an
action for histories that are not consistent with that randomness (as with that randomness
the machine will never reach these histories). It follows that an ITM defines a distribution
over reduced (pure) strategies, i.e., a mixed reduced strategy. We now formalize this claim.
Definition 5.4 (Induced mixed reduced strategy of an ITM) LetM be a probabilis-
tic ITM for player i in the extensive game Γ. Assume that M halts for any infinite vector
of coins and any sequence of messages sent by the other players, and let t be a bound on the
number of coins it reads. Let r be a (sufficiently long) coin vector for M . Then the induced
pure reduced strategy σ
(r)
i of M with randomness r is defined as follows:
• h = (a1, . . . , am) is in the domain of σ
(r)
i if and only if:
– P (a1, . . . , am) = i;
– For any 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m− 1 such that P (a1, . . . , aℓ) = i it holds that (a1, . . . , aℓ) is in
the domain of σ
(r)
i and when M with randomness r participates in an interaction,
conditioned on the sequence of sent messages being (a1, . . . , aℓ) (where aℓ+1 is a
message sent by the ITM representing player P (a1, . . . , aℓ) for any 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m−1),
the message sent by M is aℓ+1.
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• For any h = (a1, . . . , am) in the domain of σ
(r)
i , the action σ
(r)
i (a1, · · · , am) is the
message sent by M with randomness r conditioned on the sequence of sent messages
being (a1, . . . , am).
The mixed reduced strategy induced by M is now defined as follows: the probability
assigned to any pure reduced strategy σ is the probability that the induced reduced strategy
of M with randomness r is σ, where r is uniformly chosen from Ut.
In [27] it is shown that for perfect-recall extensive games (which are the only games
we will consider here), every mixed strategy has a behavioral strategy that is outcome
equivalent. (Two strategies are outcome-equivalent if for every profile of pure strategies of
the other players the two strategies induce the same distribution on outcomes; A mixed
5For completeness, we may assume that whenever M outputs on history h an action that is not in A(h),
we interpret it as abort, which is denoted in the induced game by ⊥ and is always a legal action.
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strategy is a distribution on pure strategies). Next, we define the behavioral analogue of a
mixed reduced strategy, and argue that the same holds for mixed and behavioral reduced
strategies: For perfect-recall extensive games, every mixed reduced strategy has a behavioral
reduced strategy that is outcome equivalent.
Definition 5.5 (Behavioral reduced strategy) Given a game Γ = (H,P,A, u), a be-
havioral reduced strategy for player i is a collection σi = (σi(h))h∈H of independent proba-
bility measures, where H is a subset of {h ∈ H|P (h) = i}, with the following properties:
• σi(h) is a probability measure over A(h) for every h in H.
• h = (a1, . . . , am) is inH if and only if for any 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m−1 such that P (a1, . . . , aℓ) = i
it holds that (a1, . . . , aℓ) ∈ H and σi(a1, . . . , aℓ)(aℓ+1) > 0.
Claim 5.6 Every mixed reduced strategy has a behavioral reduced strategy that is outcome
equivalent.
Proof Sketch: Every pure reduced strategy σi for player i can be extended to a (full)
pure strategy by assigning arbitrary values to all histories in {h : P (h) = i} for which σi is
undefined. The two strategies will be outcome-equivalent, as the outcome is only affected by
the consistent histories of σi. It follows that every mixed reduced strategy can be extended
to a mixed (full) strategy that is outcome-equivalent.
On the other hand, every behavioral strategy σi = (σi(h))h:P (h)=i can be restricted to a
behavioral reduced strategy by restricting the collection of probability measures accordingly.
Again, the two strategies will be outcome-equivalent, as the distribution on outcomes is only
affected by the consistent histories of σi.
Finally, as mentioned above, in [27] it is shown that for perfect-recall extensive games,
every mixed strategy has a behavioral strategy that is outcome equivalent.
Thus, given some mixed reduced strategy we extended it to a mixed strategy that is
outcome-equivalent, then transform it to a behavioral strategy that is outcome-equivalent,
and finally we restrict the resulting behavioral strategy to an outcome-equivalent behavioral
reduced strategy. 
As argued above, ITMs induce mixed reduced strategies, and by Claim 5.6, these induce
behavioral reduced strategies. Thus, in the following we will model ITMs by behavioral
reduced strategies. This is captured by the notion of strategic representation.
Definition 5.7 (Strategic representation of an ITM) Let Γ be a game and let i ∈
{1, 2}. Let M be an ITM for player i. Assume that M halts for any infinite vector of coins
and any sequence of messages sent by the other players. Let σ be the mixed reduced strategy
induced by M . Then the strategic representation of M is the behavioral reduced strategy
that is outcome-equivalent to σ.6
Similarly, for a sequence of games {Γ(k)}k∈N and an ITM M that takes a security pa-
rameter 1k, the strategic representation of M is the sequence of strategic representations of
M(1),M(12),M(13), . . . .
6In certain games there may be more than one behavioral reduced strategy that is outcome-equivalent
to σ. However, our treatment will always be indifferent to the actual choice.
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5.2.1 ε-TFNE for Reduced Strategies
In Section 4.3 we presented our general definition of TFNE. However, that definition was
framed for strategies and, following the conclusion of the previous section, we actually care
about reduced strategies. To make Definition 4.5 work for reduced strategies we notice that
only two small changes need to be made: We need to define the notion of a round R reduced
strategy, and we need to allow the constraint sets T1 and T2 to include behavioral reduced
strategies.
Definition 5.8 (Round R reduced strategy) Let Γ = (H,P,A, u) be an extensive game,
let R be a round of Γ, and let σi be a behavioral reduced strategy of player i = P (R). Then
τ = τ(R) is a round R reduced strategy of player i consistent with σi if the following hold:
• When R = 1, τ(1) is a distribution over A(ǫ).
• Otherwise, there exists some behavioral reduced strategy πi of player i for which πi(j) =
σi(j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , R−1}, and such that πi(R) = τi(R).
Throughout the paper, the behavioral reduced strategy σi with which τ(R) is consistent
will be evident from the context, and so we omit reference to this consistency requirement.
Next, we modify the definition of constraints (Definition 3.6) by allowing each constraint
set Ti to be a subset of
⊗
h:P (h)=i(Σi(h)∪ ⊥), where σi(h) =⊥ if the history h is not in the
domain of the reduced strategy σi.
Finally, we observe that, following the two modifications above, Definitions 4.4 and 4.5
work for behavioral reduced strategies as well (replacing “strategy” by “behavioral reduced
strategy” and “round R strategy” by “round R reduced strategy”).
5.3 Computational Hardness in the Game-Theoretic Setting
The security of cryptographic protocols stems from the assumption on the limitation of the
computational power of the players. In our strategic analysis of games, we also expect to
deduce the (sequential) equilibrium from this limitation. However, because protocols are
parameterized by a security parameter, a strategic analysis of protocols requires dealing
with a sequence of games rather than a single game. While relating to the sequence of
games is crucial in order to express computational hardness (as this hardness is defined in
an asymptotic manner), this raises a new difficulty: How do we extend the definition of
TFNE to sequences of games?
An appealing approach might be to try to define empty threats for sequences of games.
That is, one might consider the effect of deviations on the expected payoff as k goes to infin-
ity (much like the derivation of CNE from NE). However, to the best of our understanding
this approach cannot work. Loosely speaking, this is because in order to relate to empty
threats one has to consider deviations in internal nodes of the game tree, and it is not clear
how to define such deviations for sequences of games. Typically, the structure of the game
tree changes with k, so it is not clear even how to define an “internal node” in a sequence
of games.
Instead, our approach insists on analyzing empty threats for individual games. Thus,
our solution concept reflects a hybrid approach that relates to a protocol both as a fam-
ily of individual, extensive games and as a sequence of normal-form games. To eliminate
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empty threats one must relate to the interactive aspect of each individual game (as this
is the setting where threats are defined). In order to claim players are playing optimally
under their computational constraints, one must think of the protocol as a sequence of one-
shot games (because computational hardness is meaningful only when players are required
to choose their machines in advance, and as the traditional notion of hardness is stated
asymptotically).
5.3.1 Strategy-filters
When considering computational games Γ = {Γ(k)}k∈N, the computational bounds on the
players will be expressed by restricting the space of available strategies for the players. The
available sequences of reduced strategies for the players will be exactly those that can be
played by the ITMs that meet the computational bound on the players. In our case we will
consider PPT ITMs.
While on the one hand every PPT ITM fails on cryptographic challenges for large enough
values of the security parameter k (under appropriate assumptions), on the other hand, PPT
ITMs can have arbitrarily large size and thus arbitrarily much information hardwired, and
so for every k there is a PPT ITM that breaks the cryptographic challenges with security
parameter k. In our analysis, we would like to “filter” machines according to their ability
to break cryptographic challenges for specific k’s, and allow using them only in games that
correspond to large enough k’s, where these machines fail (and in particular, cannot use
hard-wiring to solve the cryptographic challenges).
To this end, we define the notion of a strategy-filter. For each value k of the security
parameter and value ε, a strategy-filter maps the ITM M to either ⊥ or to its strategic
representation, according to whether M(1k) violates level of security ε or does not (respec-
tively).
Definition 5.9 (Strategy-filter) Let Γ = {Γ(k)}k∈N be a computational game and let i be
a player. A strategy-filter is a sequence Fi = {F
(k)
i :M× [0, 1]→ Σ
(k)
i ∪{⊥}}k∈N such that
for every ITM M , every k ∈ N and every ε ∈ [0, 1], it holds that either F
(k)
i (M,ε) = ⊥, or
F
(k)
i (M,ε) = σ
(k)
i , where σ
(k)
i is the strategic representation of the machine M(1
k, ·).
A strategy-filter is meaningful if it allows us to reason about all reduced strategies that
are considered to be feasible, in our case PPT implementable reduced strategies, and in
particular does not filter them out. This is captured in the following definition.
Definition 5.10 (PPT-covering filter) A strategy-filter Fi is said to be PPT-covering if
for every PPT ITM M and any positive polynomial p(·) there exists k0 such that for all
k ≥ k0, it holds that F
(k)
i (M, 1/p(k)) 6= ⊥.
Typically, protocols have the following security guarantee (under computational assump-
tions): for every i, every PPT ITM M of Pi and every polynomial p(·), there exists k0 such
that for any k ≥ k0, the ITMM does not break level of security 1/p(k) in the protocol with
security parameter k. Such a protocol will naturally have a PPT-covering filter, where if
F
(k)
i (M,ε) 6= ⊥ then the reduced strategy F
(k)
i (M,ε) “does not break level of security ε in
the game Γ(k).”
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5.3.2 Tractable Reduced Strategies
As reflected above, the asymptotic nature of defining security does not determine any level
of security for any k. Rather, it dictates that any PPT ITM “eventually fails in violating
1/p(k) security” for any p(·) (where “eventually” means for large enough k). Thus, we
follow the same approach in our game theoretic analysis: roughly speaking, our solution
concept requires that ε-security will imply ε-stability for any k (rather than requiring a
particular level of stability for each k). More formally, we require that for any k and any ε,
the game induced by the protocol with security parameter k be in ε-TFNE, given that the
available strategies for the players are those that do not break level of security ε. Thus, for
any pair (k, ε) we will consider the game Γ(k) with available reduced strategies restricted
to those that guarantee ε-security. The following definition derives from a PPT-covering
filter, for each such game, the set of available reduced strategies for each player.
Definition 5.11 (Tractable reduced strategies) Let Fi be a PPT-covering filter. For
every k ∈ N and ε ∈ [0, 1] we define the set T
(k)
i,ε (Fi) of (k, ε)-tractable reduced strategies for
player i ∈ {1, 2} as
{F
(k)
i (M,ε)|M is a PPT ITM and F
(k)
i (M,ε) 6= ⊥}.
Whenever Fi will be understood from the context, we will write T
(k)
i,ε to mean T
(k)
i,ε (Fi).
5.4 Computational TFNE
We can now define our computational variant of TFNE. Roughly, the definition requires
that there exist a family of PPT compatible constraints such that for any k and any ε, the
strategies played by the machines on input security parameter k are in ε-TFNE in the game
indexed by (k, ε).
Definition 5.12 (Computational TFNE) Let Γ be a computational game. A pair of
PPT machines (M1,M2) is said to be in a computational threat-free Nash equilibrium
(CTFNE) of Γ if there exists a pair of PPT-covering filters (F1, F2) such that for every k, ε
for which F
(k)
1 (M1, ε) and F
(k)
2 (M2, ε) are tractable the profile (F
(k)
1 (M1, ε), F
(k)
2 (M2, ε))
constitutes an ε-TFNE in the (T
(k)
1,ε , T
(k)
2,ε )-constrained version of Γ
(k).
The expressive power of Definition 5.12 is illustrated through the following claim, which
refers to Example 1.2. We omit the proof, and proceed to more interesting applications in
sections 6 and 7.
Claim 5.13 In the modified one-way permutation game,
(i) the strategy profile in which P1 plays 0 and P2 plays 0 after a history of 0 and randomly
otherwise is a CTFNE, and
(ii) any profile in which P2 plays randomly after history 0 is not a CTFNE.
We note that part (ii) of the claim can easily be extended to profiles in which, after
history 0, P2 plays 0 with probability at most 1− p(k) for any polynomial p.
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6 The Coin-Flipping Game
In the following we describe a classic protocol for coin-flipping, formulated as a sequence
of games (parameterized by a security parameter k). We then show that the prescribed
behavior according to that protocol constitutes a CTFNE in the sequence of games.
Following is an informal description of the sequence of games. We assume some perfectly
binding commitment scheme with the following properties (see Appendix A for a formal
definition):
• For any security parameter k (which is a common input to the sender and receiver),
the “commit” phase consists of one message from the sender to the receiver, denoted
com
(k), which is of length bounded by p(k) for some polynomial p.
• For any PPT ITM, the advantage in guessing the committed value given the afore-
mentioned message is negligible in k.
The description defines the legal messages in each game. Recall that at any phase where a
player is supposed to send a message, the move “abort” is legal (and well-defined). Note
also, that any illegal message is interpreted as abort by the other player. The game Γ(k) is
defined as follows:
1. Player 1 chooses a string c of length at most p(k) and sends it to player 2.
2. Player 2 chooses a bit r2, and sends r2 to player 1.
3. Player 1 does one of the following: (1) sends to player 2 decom, where decom is a legal
decommitment to c revealing that the committed value was 1 − r2 (in that case the
payoffs are (1,0)); or (2) aborts (in that case the payoffs are (0,1)).
Any other abort results in the aborting player receiving payoff 0, and the other player
receiving 1.
We now describe a pair of interactive ITMs for the game Γ(k) that form a CTFNE.
We describe them interleaved, in the form of a protocol. We denote the ITMs playing the
strategies of P1, P2 by M1,M2, respectively.
1. Player 1 chooses a random bit r1, and sends c = com
(k)(r1) to player 2 (player 1 also
obtains decom, which is a legal decommitment to c).
2. Player 2 chooses a random bit r2, and sends r2 to player 1.
3. If r1 6= r2, player 1 sends decom to player 2. Else, player 1 aborts.
Theorem 6.1 The pair (M1,M2) forms a CTFNE for the protocol above.
Proof: First we define the functions F
(k)
1 and F
(k)
2 . For any k, the function F
(k)
1 never
maps to ⊥ (this, roughly speaking, reflects the fact that the protocol is secure against an
all-powerful player 1). For F2 we use the following rule: F
(k)
2 (M,ε) = ⊥ if and only if
“for security parameter k, the PPT ITM M guesses the committed value with advantage
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greater than ε.” More formally, F
(k)
2 (M,ε) = ⊥ if and only if when player 1 sends as the first
message a random commitment of a random bit (i.e., chooses a random bit and then uses the
aforementioned commitment scheme using uniformly random coins), then the message with
which M reacts is the committed value of player 1 with probability greater than 1/2 + ε.
The fact that F1 is PPT-covering is straightforward. The fact that F2 is PPT covering
follows directly from the security of the commitment scheme: For any positive polynomial
p, every PPT ITM has advantage smaller than 1/p(k) in guessing the committed value with
security parameter k, for large enough k’s.
Next, we need to show that for every k, ε for which F
(k)
1 (M1, ε) 6=⊥ and F
(k)
2 (M2, ε) 6=⊥
the profile (F
(k)
1 (M1, ε), F
(k)
2 (M2, ε)) constitutes an ε-TFNE in the T = (T
(k)
1,ε , T
(k)
2,ε )-constrained
version of Γ(k). Let k, ε be as above, and let σ = (σ1, σ2) = (F
(k)
1 (M1, ε), F
(k)
2 (M2, ε)). We
first show that σ constitutes an ε-NE in the T -constrained version of Γ(k).
The strategy σ1 chooses a random commitment of a random bit in round 1, and in
round 3 decommits whenever it can. It is easy to see that this is optimal, as player 2 always
guesses the committed value with probability 1/2, and so there is no strategy for player 1
for which he can decommit with probability greater than 1/2 in round 3. It is also easy
to see that player 2’s strategy is an ε best-response, as any PPT ITM M2 for player 2 for
which F
(k)
2 (M2, ε) 6=⊥ does not guess with advantage more than ε. We conclude that σ
constitutes an ε-NE in the T -constrained version of the game Γ(k).
Next, we show that no player is facing an ε-threat with respect to σ at any round of the
T -constrained version of Γ(k). Note that for both players, the expected payoff according to
σ is 1/2. Suppose some player is facing an ε-threat with respect to σ. We divide the proof
into cases.
Case 1 – P1 is facing an ε-threat in round 3: In order for P1 to improve in Step 3
by more than ε, it must play a round 3 strategy τ(3) in which he sends decom that proves
that r1 6= r2 with larger probability than in σ. However, since in σ player 1 sends decom
whenever r1 6= r2 (and otherwise no such decom exists, since the commitment is perfectly
binding), we conclude that no such τ(3) exists.
Case 2 – P2 is facing an ε-threat in round 2: According to the constraints, P2 cannot
guess r1 with probability greater than 1/2+ε. So in order for him to improve by more than
ε, it must be the case that he has some round 2 strategy τ(2), such that in any ε-threat-free
continuation in Cont(σ(1), τ(2)) player 1 aborts with positive probability conditioned on
r1 6= r2. However, any continuation where P1 aborts with zero probability conditioned on
r1 6= r2 (and sends decom) is ε-threat-free, and so there is no deviation for P2 for which he
improves on all ε-threat-free continuation.
Case 3 – P1 is facing an ε-threat in round 1: Since σ is ε-threat-free on round 1, if
P1 is threatened in round 1 then he has a round 1 strategy τ(1) so that for all ε-threat-
free profiles in Cont(τ(1)) his expected payoff is greater than 1/2 + ε. Consider the profile
σ′ = (τ(1), σ(2), σ(3)). This profile gives both players an expected payoff of 1/2 (assuming
τ(1) aborts with probability 0, which is clearly optimal), and is ε-threat-free on round 2
(by the same argument as Case 1 above). If σ′ is ε-threat-free on round 1 as well, then
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P1 does not improve by more than ε using the deviation τ(1). If σ
′ is not ε-threat-free on
round 1, then in any ε-threat-free profile in Cont(τ(1)) player 2’s payoff must be greater
than 1/2 + ε. However, this means that P1’s payoff is less than 1/2, and again he does not
improve using the deviation τ(1). Hence, the postulated τ(1) does not exist, and so P1 is
not facing an ε-threat in round 1.
7 Correlated Equilibria Without a Mediator
In one of the first papers to consider the intersection of game theory and cryptography,
Dodis, Halevi and Rabin proposed an appealing methodology for implementing a correlated
equilibrium in a 2-player normal-form game without making use of a mediator [6]. Under
standard hardness assumptions, they showed that for any 2-player normal-form game Γ
and any correlated equilibrium σ for Γ, there exists a new 2-player extensive “extended
game” Γ′ and a CNE σ′ for Γ′, such that σ and σ′ achieve the same payoffs for the players.
(Strictly speaking Γ′ is a sequence of games indexed by a security parameter, and a CNE
is defined for a sequence.) However, as already pointed out by Dodis et al., their protocol
lacks a satisfactory analysis of its sequential nature – the resulting “extended game” is an
extensive game, but the solution concept they use, CNE, is not strong enough for these
games.
In the following, we extend the definition of CTFNE to allow handling this setting (that
is, we define CTFNE for extensive games with simultaneous moves at the leaves), give
some justification for our new definition, and then provide a new protocol for removing
the mediator that achieves CTFNE in a wide class of correlated equilibria that are in the
convex hull of Nash equilibria (see definition below).
7.1 The Dodis-Halevi-Rabin Protocol
The “extended game” Γ′ consists of 2 phases. In the first phase (“preamble phase”), the
players execute a protocol for sampling a pair under the distribution σ, and in the second
phase each player plays the action implied by the sampled pair, in the original normal-form
game. The CNE of the extended game is the profile that consists of each player playing
the protocol honestly in the first phase, and then in the second phase, if the other player
did not abort, choosing the action by the protocol’s result, and otherwise “punishing” the
other player by choosing a “min-max” action (i.e., choosing an action minimizing the utility
resulting from the other player’s best response).
This profile is indeed a CNE because an efficient player can achieve only a negligible
advantage by trying to break the cryptography in the first phase, cannot achieve any advan-
tage by aborting in the first phase (as this minimizes its best possible move in the second
phase), and cannot gain any advantage in the expectation of the payoff by deviating in the
second phase, because the players are playing a pair of actions from a correlated equilibrium.
7.2 TFNE for Games with Simultaneous Moves at the Leaves
The definition of an extensive game with simultaneous moves is similar to the definition
of an ordinary extensive game. The main difference is that now the function P maps to
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(nonempty) sets of players rather than to single players. The definition of history is then
changed to a sequence of sets of actions rather than a sequence of actions, and the definitions
of a strategy and a payoff function are both also changed accordingly. For a formal definition
see Osborne and Rubinstein [27].
In order to adjust our definition for extensive games with simultaneous moves, we notice
that when a player deviates on a history with a simultaneous move, he cannot expect the
other to react to this deviation (because they both play at the same time). However, in order
to argue that a profile is rational, we still need to require that for every simultaneous move
in the equilibrium support, each player is playing a “best response” given the other player’s
prescribed behavior. This means the prescribed behavior for the players should form some
kind of equilibrium for normal-form games. In our case, the prescribed behavior will form
a NE. The question of what should a CTFNE profile prescribe in off-equilibrium-support
histories is more delicate: Clearly, in order to claim that the profile is “rational,” again
we need some kind of equilibrium for normal-form games. In our case the only deviation
will be prematurely aborting without completing the preamble phase, which leads to the
original normal-form game without agreeing on a sampled pair. In this case one can argue
that after one player aborted, the other (non-aborting) player cannot assume the aborting
player will play his prescribed behavior in the simultaneous move (as he is already not
following his prescribed behavior). However, we argue that it is in fact still rational to
assume the aborting player will play his prescribed behavior. The justification for this
claim is essentially the same as the justification for the rationality of NE. Once there is a
prescribed behavior that is a NE, each player knows the other has no incentive to deviate,
and so he also has no incentive to deviate. The essential difference between a deviation
in an extensive game and a deviation in a simultaneous move, is that in the former, once
a player deviated, the other player is facing a fact. He now has to readjust his behavior
according to this deviation. However, in the latter, there is no point for a player to deviate
from the prescribed NE, because the other player will not know about this deviation prior
to choosing his move (if at all). Thus, for terminal leaves that are off-equilibrium-support
(i.e., in the original normal-form game that follows an abort of some player), we claim it is
sufficient for a CTFNE to prescribe a NE as well.
The bottom line of this discussion is that players cannot assume other players will
deviate from any prescribed NE in any terminal leaf. Thus, our new definition of TFNE for
extensive games with simultaneous moves at the leaves (abbreviated GSML) is essentially
the same as the original definition, except that (i) we require a profile in TFNE to prescribe
a NE in any terminal leaf, and (ii) in the definition of a threat we do not allow a player
to assume the other will deviate from his strategy in any NE at a terminal leaf. In order
to formally modify our definition of TFNE to achieve (ii), essentially we would need to
define the only threat-free continuation on a leaf to be the one that assigns to the players
the actions in the prescribed NE (which expresses the idea that a player is not allowed to
assume the other will deviate from his strategy in any NE).
However, we adopt an equivalent, simpler convention. Given a GSML Γ and a profile
σ that assigns a NE at every simultaneous move, we look at a slightly modified game Γ′:
All simultaneous moves are removed, and instead at each leaf where a simultaneous move
was removed each player is assigned his expected payoff in the corresponding NE for that
leaf. Note that the modified game is now a regular extensive game with no simultaneous
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moves. We then “prune” the strategy profile to remove all the distributions on actions on
all simultaneous leaves and denote the resulting profile σ′. We say that σ is a TFNE in Γ
if σ′ is a TFNE in Γ′. We call Γ′ and σ′ the pruned representation of Γ and σ.
The definition of CTFNE for GSML is derived from the above definition of TFNE for
GSML, similarly to the derivation of CTFNE from TFNE in the non-simultaneous case.
A note on the strength of our definition It seems that for general GSMLs our
definition is too strong. The reason is that in certain cases it is computationally intractable
for the players to play the prescribed NE in every leaf (it is easy to construct simple
sequences of games where one cannot assign tractable Nash equilibria at all leaves). While
we do not yet know how to relax our definition to apply to these cases, we believe our
definition, when met, is sufficient.
7.3 Our Protocol
For a non-trivial class of correlated equilibria, we show how to modify the DHR protocol
to achieve CTFNE. Our basic idea is to use Nash equilibria as “punishments” for aborting
players. That is, if there is a NE that assigns to a player a payoff at most his expected payoff
when not aborting, then assigning this NE in case he aborts serves as a punishment and
yields that the player has no incentive to abort. In the following we characterize a family
of correlated equilibria for which we can use the aforementioned punishing technique, and
prove that for this family we can remove the mediator while achieving CTFNE.
We say that a correlated equilibrium π is a convex combination of Nash equilibria if π
is induced by a distribution on (possibly mixed) Nash equilibria. (The set of such distri-
butions is sometimes referred to as the convex hull of Nash equilibria.) Note that any such
distribution is a correlated equilibrium (CE), but the converse is not true.
Let π be a correlated equilibrium for a two-player game Γ that is a convex combination
of a set N of NEs. We say that π is weakly Pareto optimal if there does not exist a
different CE ρ in the convex hull of N for which both E[u1(O(ρ))] > E[u1(O(π))] and
E[u2(O(ρ))] > E[u2(O(π))].
We say that a distribution is samplable if there exists a probabilistic TM that halts on
every infinite randomness vector, and can sample it. This is equivalent to requiring that all
probabilities can be expressed in binary (assuming we work over {0, 1}). Note that every
distribution can be approximated arbitrarily accurately by a samplabale distribution.
Theorem 7.1 Assume there exists a non-interactive computationally binding commitment
scheme. Let π be a weakly Pareto optimal correlated equilibrium for a two-player game Γ
that is a samplable convex combination Π of some set of samplable Nash equilibria. Then
there exists an extended extensive game and a profile that achieves the same expected payoffs
as π and is a CTFNE.
Proof: Since Π is samplable, the common denominator of all probabilities in Π is a
power of two. Thus, we can assume Π is a uniform distribution on a sequence of Nash
equilibria that may contain repetitions, where the length of the sequence is a power of two.
Let 2ℓ be the length of that sequence, and let (π0ℓ , . . . , π1ℓ) be that sequence. Note that
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the distribution π can now be generated by first choosing uniformly at random a string r
in {0, 1}ℓ, and then choosing a pair of actions according to πr.
Let σ̂i be the NE that assigns the worst payoff for Pi (this value represents the “severest
punishment” for player i).
Our protocol embeds a 2-party string sampling protocol, which is a simple generaliza-
tion of the Blum coin flipping protocol [5]. The protocol consists of simply running the
Blum protocol in parallel for a fixed number of times. This protocol, in turn, relies on a
perfectly binding commitment scheme as in Section 6, whose formal definition can be found
in Appendix A.
As in Section 6, we describe the two ITMs that form the protocol in an interleaved
manner. We denote the ITMs playing the strategies of P1, P2 by M1,M2, respectively.
• Round 1: Player 1 chooses uniformly at random a string r = (r1, . . . , rℓ) from {0, 1}
ℓ,
and sends c = (c1 = com
(k)(r1), . . . , cℓ = com
(k)(rℓ)) to player 2 (player 1 also obtains
(decom1, . . . , decomℓ), where decomi is a legal decommitment with respect to ci and
ri).
• Round 2: If player 1 aborted, the assigned NE is σ̂1. Else, player 2 chooses a uniformly
random string r′ = (r′1, . . . , r
′
ℓ) from {0, 1}
ℓ, and sends r′ to player 1.
• Round 3: If player 2 aborted, the assigned NE is σ̂2. Else, player 1 sends the message
((r1, decom1), . . . , (rℓ, decomℓ)).
• If player 1 aborted, the assigned NE is σ̂1. Else, player 2 verifies that decomi is a legal
decommitment with respect to ci and ri for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. If the verification fails (which
is equivalent to an abort of player 1, as it means player 1 sent an illegal message), the
assigned NE is σ̂1. Else, the assigned NE is πr⊕r′ (where ⊕ is bitwise exclusive-or).
Lemma 7.2 The pair (M1,M2) forms a CTFNE for the protocol above.
Proof: Let {Γ˜(k)}k∈N be the sequence of games induced by the protocol. Denote the
pruned representation of Γ˜(k) by Γ(k). Let σ˜
(k)
1 , σ˜
(k)
2 be the strategies of P1, P2 in the
protocol with security parameter k, and let σ
(k)
1 , σ
(k)
2 be their pruned representations. Let
σ(k) = (σ
(k)
1 , σ
(k)
2 ). We prove that {σ
(k)} is a CTFNE in {Γ(k)}, which, by the discussion of
Section 7.2, implies that {σ˜(k)} is a CTFNE in {Γ˜(k)}.
First we define the functions F
(k)
1 and F
(k)
2 . For any k, the function F
(k)
1 never maps to
⊥ (this, roughly speaking, reflects the fact that the protocol is secure against an all-powerful
player 1, which follows from the perfect binding property of the commitment scheme). For
F2 we use the following rule: F
(k)
2 (M,ε) = ⊥ if and only if
E[u
(k)
2 (O(σ
(k)
1 , σ
(k)
M ))] ≥ E[u
(k)
2 (O(σ
(k)))] + ε, (1)
where σ
(k)
M is the strategic representation of machine M and σ
(k)
1 is the strategic representa-
tion of machineM1, both with security parameter k. In other words, P2 cannot unilaterally
ε-improve in the (T
(k)
1,ε , T
(k)
2,ε )-constrained version of Γ
(k).
The fact that F1 is PPT-covering is straightforward. The fact that F2 is PPT covering
follows from the security of the commitment scheme, as we prove next.
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Claim 7.3 The strategy-filter F2 is PPT-covering.
Proof: Suppose F2 is not PPT-covering. Then from (1) there is a PPT ITM M
and a polynomial p such that
E[u
(k)
2 (O(σ
(k)
1 , σ
(k)
M ))] ≥ E[u
(k)
2 (O(σ
(k)
1 , σ
(k)
2 ))] + 1/p(k) (2)
for infinitely many k’s, where σ
(k)
M is the strategic representation of the machine M
with security parameter k.
First, we show that we can assume M does not abort in round 2. An abort of P2
leads to a leaf with σ̂2. But since π is a convex combination of NEs, following the
protocol would mean playing a NE. Since by definition σ̂2 is the worst NE for player 2,
it follows that the machine M ′ that behaves the same as M , but whenever M aborts,
M ′ instead follows the protocol (i.e. acts like M2) does at least as well as M . The
machine M ′ is well-defined, as the reduced strategy σ
(k)
2 is in fact a full strategy, and
is defined everywhere.7
Since the payoffs in {Γ(k)} are bounded in k and the number of NEs in π is fixed in k,
by (2) there exists a polynomial p and (at least one) s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ such that for infinitely
many k’s
Pr[O(σ
(k)
1 , σ
(k)
M ) = πs]− Pr[O(σ
(k)
1 , σ
(k)
2 ) = πs] ≥ 1/p(k).
It follows that for infinitely many k’s
Pr
(σ
(k)
1 ,σ
(k)
M
)
[r ⊕ r′ = s] − Pr
(σ
(k)
1 ,σ
(k)
2 )
[r ⊕ r′ = s] ≥ 1/p(k). (3)
Claim 7.4 There exists a polynomial q such that for each k satisfying (3) there exists
some i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} for which
Pr
(σ
(k)
1 ,σ
(k)
M
)
[ri ⊕ r
′
i = si|rj ⊕ r
′
j = sj ∀j < i]− 1/2 ≥ 1/q(k). (4)
Proof: We show that the claim holds with q(k) = 2ℓ · p(k). Let k be such that
(3) holds, and suppose towards a contradiction that (4) does not hold for any
7Note that we assume here that there exists such PPT ITM M ′. This may not always be the case. One
reason is that sometimes detecting with probability 1 whether M aborted cannot be done in polynomial
time (or at all). The reason is that any illegal message is regarded as abort, but sometimes a party cannot
“know” whether its message is illegal or not. See [3], Section 6.3 for an example. Another reason could be
that in order to “emulate” M2, the machine M
′ needs to be in some internal state. We note, however, that
in our case neither problem occurs.
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i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Then
Pr
(σ
(k)
1 ,σ
(k)
M
)
[r ⊕ r′ = s] − Pr
(σ
(k)
1 ,σ
(k)
2 )
[r ⊕ r′ = s]
= Pr
(σ
(k)
1 ,σ
(k)
M
)
[r1 ⊕ r
′
1 = s1] · Pr
(σ
(k)
1 ,σ
(k)
M
)
[r2 ⊕ r
′
2 = s2|r1 ⊕ r
′
1 = s1] · . . .
· Pr
(σ
(k)
1 ,σ
(k)
M
)
[rℓ ⊕ r
′
ℓ = sℓ|rj ⊕ r
′
j = sj ∀j < ℓ]− Pr
(σ
(k)
1 ,σ
(k)
2 )
[r ⊕ r′ = s]
<
(
1
2
+
1
q(k)
)ℓ
−
1
2ℓ
<
2ℓ
q(k)
=
1
p(k)
.
The first inequality holds since the distribution on r ⊕ r′ in (σ
(k)
1 , σ
(k)
2 ) is uni-
form on {0, 1}ℓ. The second inequality follows from the observation that in
(1/2 + 1/q(k))ℓ we are summing over 2ℓ terms, one equal to 1/2ℓ and the others
strictly smaller than 1/q(k). Thus, we get a contradiction to (3).
Since there are infinitely many k’s for which (4) holds, and because ℓ is fixed, there
must exist some i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} for which (4) holds infinitely often. This, however,
yields a PPT machine A that breaks the hiding property of the commitment scheme:
Given a commitment c = com(k)(r) for a uniformly chosen random bit r, the machine
A chooses uniformly at random a string (r1, . . . , ri−1, ri+1, . . . , rℓ) from {0, 1}
ℓ−1, and
runs M on
(c1 = com
(k)(r1), . . . , ci−1 = com
(k)(ri−1), c, ci+1 = com
(k)(ri+1), . . . , cℓ = com
(k)(rℓ))
to get output r′. Then, if rj ⊕ r
′
j = sj ∀j < i, algorithm A outputs si ⊕ r
′
i, and
otherwise A outputs a uniformly random bit. Clearly A is a PPT machine. From
(3) it follows that infinitely often, with probability at least 1/2ℓ it will be the case
that rj ⊕ r
′
j = sj ∀j < i. Once r
′ is such that rj ⊕ r
′
j = sj ∀j < i, (4) implies that
Pr[si ⊕ r
′
i = ri|rj ⊕ r
′
j = sj ∀j < i] ≥ 1/2 + q(k). Thus, in total, for infinitely many
k’s it holds that
Pr[si ⊕ r
′
i = ri] =
(
1−
1
2ℓ
)
·
1
2
+
1
2ℓ
·
(
1
2
+ q(k)
)
=
1
2
+
q(k)
2ℓ
,
which means that A breaks the hiding property of the commitment scheme. This is a
contradiction.
Next, we show that for all k, ε for which F
(k)
1 (M1, ε) 6=⊥ and F
(k)
2 (M2, ε) 6=⊥ the profile
(F
(k)
1 (M1, ε), F
(k)
2 (M2, ε)) constitutes an ε-TFNE in the T = (T
(k)
1,ε , T
(k)
2,ε )-constrained version
of Γ(k). Let k, ε be as above, and let σ = (σ1, σ2) = (F
(k)
1 (M1, ε), F
(k)
2 (M2, ε)). We first show
that σ constitutes an ε-NE in the T -constrained version of Γ(k). Suppose P1 unilaterally
ε-improves in the T -constrained version of Γ(k). From similar arguments as above we can
29
assume P1 never aborts. But when P1 never aborts the outcome is exactly π, as the players
are playing πr⊕r′ , and r
′ is chosen uniformly at random.
Suppose now that P2 unilaterally ε-improves in the T -constrained version of Γ
(k). How-
ever, this is a contradiction to the constraints, that state that for any k P2 cannot unilat-
erally ε-improve in the (T
(k)
1,ε , T
(k)
2,ε )-constrained version of Γ
(k).
Next, we show that no player is ε-threatened with respect to σ at any round of the T -
constrained version of Γ(k). To this end, suppose towards a contradiction that some player
is ε-threatened with respect to σ. We divide the proof into cases.
Case 1 – P1 is facing an ε-threat in round 3: In step 3 player 1 has exactly two
options: He can (i) play honestly, send ((r1, decom1), . . . , (rℓ, decomℓ)) which he generated
in round 1, and receive E[u1(O(σ))], or he can (ii) abort and receive E[u1(O(σ̂
1))]. The
value E[u1(O(σ̂
1))] is at most E[u1(O(σ))], and so P1 cannot improve over E[u1(O(σ))].
Hence player 1 is not facing an ε-threat at round 3.
Case 2 – P2 is facing an ε-threat in round 2: We first note that for any round 1
strategy for P1 and round 2 strategy for P2, the round strategy of playing honestly in round
3 for P1 is threat-free, since he cannot improve over that strategy (again, since his only
deviation is aborting, which gives him the worst possible NE). Thus, if P2 is ε-threatened
at round 2, he has some round strategy that ε-improves over E[u2(O(σ))] when P1 plays
in round 3 (and 1) according to the protocol. This means that P2 unilaterally ε-improves,
which contradicts the constraints (as well as the ε-NE).
Case 3 – P1 is facing an ε-threat in round 1: If P1 is ε-threatened in round 1, he
has some round 1 strategy τ(1) for which every ε-threat-free continuation ε-improves over
every ε-threat-free continuation of σ1(1). We will describe an ε-threat-free continuation of
τ(1) and an ε-threat-free continuation of σ1(1) that contradict this.
The ε-threat-free continuation of σ1(1): We established in Case 2 that when P1 plays
honestly in round 1, if P2 plays honestly in round 2 he is not ε-threatened. We also
established there that P1 playing honestly in round 3 is always ε-threat-free. If follows
that the continuation of both players playing honestly in rounds 2 and 3 is an ε-threat-free
continuation of σ1(1). On this profile P1 receives E[u1(O(σ))].
The ε-threat-free continuation of τ1(1): As we established in Case 2, playing honestly
in round 3 is always ε-threat-free for P1. Now, note that there is no profile in which
both players improve simultaneously – because all leaves are Nash equilibria, such a profile
would be a distribution on Nash equilibria that contradicts the Pareto-optimality of π.
Note also that because P1 receives the worst possible payoff when he aborts, it follows that
he improves also conditioned on not aborting (as this can only help him). Thus, in any
threat-free continuation of τ(1), conditioned on P1 not aborting in round 1, P2 again cannot
improve over E[u2(O(σ))], as this again contradicts the Pareto-optimality of π. However, if
P2 plays honestly in round 2 and then P1 plays honestly in round 3, then P2 receives exactly
E[u2(O(σ))] conditioned on P1 not aborting in round 1. It follows that this continuation is
the best possible for P2, and thus P2 is not ε-threatened in round 2 of this continuation.
It follows that this continuation is ε-threat-free. However, in this continuation P1 receives
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E[u1(O(σ))] conditioned on not aborting, and thus receives at most E[u1(O(σ))] without
the conditioning.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
8 A General Theorem
In this section we prove a general theorem identifying sufficient conditions for a strategy
profile to be a TFNE. The first condition is that the profile must be weakly Pareto optimal:
Definition 8.1 (Weakly Pareto optimal) A strategy profile σ ∈ T of an extensive game
Γ = (H,P,A, u) with constraints T is weakly Pareto optimal if there does not exist a strategy
profile π ∈ T for which both E[u1(O(π))] > E[u1(O(σ))] and E[u2(O(π))] > E[u2(O(σ))].
Next, we require the profile to be ε-safe. Intuitively, this just means that a player cannot
harm the other too much by a unilateral deviation (as opposed to not being able to gain
too much, which is the NE condition).
Definition 8.2 (ε-safe) A strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ T of an extensive game Γ =
(H,P,A, u) with constraints T = (T1, T2) is ε-safe if for each player i,
E [u−i (O(σ))] ≥ E
[
u−i
(
O(σ′i, σ−i)
)]
− ε
for every strategy σ′i ∈ Ti of player i.
Finally, we have the following theorem. Note that we are implicitly assuming that the
extensive games in the claim are derived from a cryptographic protocol or some other setting
in which it is natural to discuss the “rounds” of a game.
Theorem 8.3 Let Γ = (H,P,A, u) be an extensive game with constraints T = (T1, T2),
and let σ = (σ1, σ2) be a weakly Pareto optimal ε-NE of Γ that is ε-safe. Then σ is an
ε-TFNE of Γ.
We also have the following corollary.
Corollary 8.4 Let Γ = (H,P,A, u) be a zero-sum extensive game with constraints T =
(T1, T2), and let σ be an ε-NE of Γ. Then σ is an ε-TFNE of Γ.
The corollary follows from the observation that any ε-NE of a zero-sum game is both
weakly Pareto optimal and ε-safe. Note that the corollary implies the threat-freeness part
of Theorem 6.1.
We now prove Theorem 8.3.
Proof: Suppose towards contradiction that at least one of the players is facing an ε-threat
with respect to σ at some round. Let R be the latest such round: that is, player i is facing
an ε-threat at round R with respect to σ, and no player is facing an ε-threat at any round
R′ that follows R.
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By Definition 4.4 it follows that there exists a round R strategy τ = τ(R) for player
i such that the set Cont(σ(1, . . . , R− 1), τ(R)) is nonempty, and such that for all π ∈
Cont(σ(1, . . . , R−1), τ(R)) and π′ ∈ Cont(σ(1, . . . , R)) that are ε-threat-free on R it holds
that
E [ui (O(π))] > E
[
ui
(
O(π′)
)]
+ ε, (5)
where
σ(1, . . . , S)
def
= σ(1), . . . , σ(S)
and
Cont(σ(1, . . . , R))
def
=
{
π ∈ T : π(S) = σ(S) for all S ≤ R
}
.
Note that σ ∈ Cont(σ(1, . . . , R)). Also note that, because R is the latest round on which
an ε-threat occurs, the profile σ is ε-threat-free on R.
Using inequality (5) we can then infer that for any π ∈ Cont(σ(1, . . . , R−1), τ(R)) that
is ε-threat-free on R it holds that
E [ui (O(π))] > E [ui (O(σ))] + ε. (6)
Let π1 ∈ Cont(σ(1, . . . , R−1), τ(R)) be one such ε-threat-free profile, and let σ1 =
(π1i , σ−i).
Fix R1 = R and τ1 = τ for consistent notation. We next ask, is player i facing an
ε-threat with respect to σ1 at any round R′ that follows R1? If yes, let R2 be the next
such round: there is no R′ between R1 and R2 on which player i is facing an ε-threat
with respect to σ1. By Definition 4.4 it follows that there exists a round R2 strategy τ2
for player i such that Cont(σ1(1, . . . , R2−1), τ2(R2)) is nonempty, and such that for all
π ∈ Cont(σ1(1, . . . , R2−1), τ2(R2)) and π′ ∈ Cont(σ1(1, . . . , R2)) that are ε-threat-free on
R2 it holds that
E [ui (O(π))] > E
[
ui
(
O(π′)
)]
+ ε.
Assume τ2 is maximal, in the sense that for any π ∈ Cont(σ1(1, . . . , R2 − 1), τ2(R2))
that is ε-threat-free on R2, player i is not facing an ε-threat at round R2 with respect to
π. Pick some arbitrary π2 ∈ Cont(σ1(1, . . . , R2−1), τ2(R2)), and fix σ2 = (π2i , σ−i).
We now repeat the above procedure, finding the next threat to player i and letting him
act on that threat, as follows. For t = 3, 4, . . . we ask, is player i facing an ε-threat with
respect to σt−1 at any round R′ that follows Rt−1? If yes, let Rt be the next such round:
there is no R′ between Rt−1 and Rt on which player i is facing an ε-threat with respect to
σt−1.
By Definition 4.4 it follows that there exists a round Rt strategy τ t for player i such that
Cont(σt−1(1, . . . , Rt−1), τ t(Rt)) is nonempty, and such that for all π ∈ Cont(σt−1(1, . . . , Rt−
1), τ t(Rt)) and π′ ∈ Cont(σt−1(1, . . . , Rt)) that are ε-threat-free on Rt it holds that
E [ui (O(π))] > E
[
ui
(
O(π′)
)]
+ ε.
Assume τ t is maximal, in the sense that for any π ∈ Cont(σt−1(1, . . . , Rt− 1), τ t(Rt))
that is ε-threat-free on Rt, player i is not facing an ε-threat at round Rt with respect to π.
Pick some arbitrary πt ∈ Cont(σt−1(1, . . . , Rt−1), τ t(Rt)), and fix σt = (πti , σ−i).
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Finally, after repeating this for all t until there are no more ε-threats to Pi on any round
that follows R, we are left with a profile σC = (πCi , σ−i) on which player i is not facing an
ε-threat at any round below R.
Fix ρ = σC , and recall that, by construction, ρ−i = σ−i. Because σ is ε-safe, it must be
the case that
E [u−i (O(ρ))] ≥ E [u−i (O(σ))]− ε. (7)
We next ask, is player −i facing an ε-threat with respect to ρ at any round S that
follows R? As the following claim shows, the answer is positive:
Claim 8.5 Player −i is facing an ε-threat with respect to ρ at some round S that follows
R.
Proof: Suppose not. By our construction of ρ, player i is also not facing an ε-
threat with respect to ρ at any round that follows R. This means that the profile ρ is
ε-threat-free on the subgames R.
Since ρ ∈ Cont(σ(1, . . . , R−1), τ(R)) and since σ ∈ Cont(σ(1, . . . , R)) is ε-threat-free
on R, we can then use (6) to infer that
E [ui (O(ρ))] > E [ui (O(σ))] + ε.
However, since ρ = (πCi , σ−i) is a unilateral deviation of player i, this contradicts the
fact that σ constitutes an ε-NE.
Let S1 be the latest round on which P−i is facing an ε-threat with respect to ρ. By
Definition 4.4 it follows that there exists a round S1 strategy µ1 for player −i such that
Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S1−1), µ1(S1)) is nonempty, and such that for all π ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S1−
1), µ1(S1)) and π′ ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S1)) that are ε-threat-free on S1 it holds that
E [ui (O(π))] > E
[
ui
(
O(π′)
)]
+ ε.
Assume µ1 is maximal, in the sense that for any π ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S1−1), µ1(S1)) that
is ε-threat-free on S1, player −i is not facing an ε-threat at round S1 with respect to π.
Pick some ρ1 ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S1−1), µ1(S1)) that is ε-threat-free on S1 – such a ρ1 must
exist by Proposition 4.6.
Now, note that because S1 was the last round on which P−i is facing an ε-threat, and
because Pi is not facing an ε-threat at any round following R with respect to ρ, it must be
the case that ρ is ε-threat-free on S1. Since ρ ∈ Cont(ρ(1, . . . , S1)) we then have that
E
[
u−i
(
O(ρ1)
)]
> E [u−i (O(ρ))] + ε ≥ E [u−i (O(σ))] ,
where the second inequality follows from (7). We now repeat the above procedure, finding
the preceding threat to player −i (but that still follows R) and letting him act on that
threat, as follows. For t = 2, 3, . . . we ask, is P−i facing an ε-threat with respect to ρ
t−1 at
any round S that follows R? If yes, let St be the latest such round. By Definition 4.4 it
follows that there exists a round St strategy µt for player −i such that Cont(ρt−1(1, . . . , St−
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1), µt(St)) is nonempty, and such that for all π ∈ Cont(ρt−1(1, . . . , St− 1), µt(St)) and
π′ ∈ Cont(ρt−1(1, . . . , St)) that are ε-threat-free on St it holds that
E [ui (O(π))] > E
[
ui
(
O(π′)
)]
+ ε.
Assume µt is maximal, in the sense that for any π ∈ Cont(ρt−1(1, . . . , St− 1), µt(St))
that is ε-threat-free on St, player −i is not facing an ε-threat at round St with respect to
π. Pick some ρt ∈ Cont(ρt−1(1, . . . , St− 1), µt(St)) that is ε-threat-free on St – again, such
a ρt must exist by Proposition 4.6.
Now, note that because St was the last round on which P−i is facing an ε-threat, P−i is
not facing an ε-threat with respect to ρt−1 at any round following St. Since ρt−1 was chosen
to be ε-threat free on St−1, player i is not facing an ε-threat with respect to ρt−1 at any
round following St−1. Finally, by construction, Pi is not facing an ε-threat at any round
following R with respect to ρ. Since ρ and ρt−1 are equivalent up to round St−1, it must be
the case that Pi is not facing an ε-threat with respect to ρ
t−1 at any round between St and
St−1 either. Thus, ρt−1 is ε-threat-free on St. Since ρt−1 ∈ Cont(ρt−1(1, . . . , St)), we then
have that
E
[
u−i
(
O(ρt)
)]
> E
[
u−i
(
O(ρt−1)
)]
+ ε
> E [u−i (O(ρ))] + t · ε
≥ E [u−i (O(σ))] + (t− 1) · ε.
Finally, after repeating this for all t until there are no more ε-threats to P−i at any
round that follows R, we are left with a profile ρD ∈ Cont(σ(1, . . . , R−1), τ(R)) on which
both Pi and P−i are not facing an ε-threat at any round that follows R. We can then use
(6) to infer that
E
[
ui
(
O(ρD)
)]
> E [ui (O(σ))] + ε.
Furthermore, ρD satisfies
E
[
u−i
(
O(ρD)
)]
> E
[
u−i
(
O(ρD−1)
)]
+D · ε ≥ E [u−i (O(σ))] ,
since D ≥ 1.
We conclude that on the profile ρD both players strictly improve over σ, contradicting
the weak Pareto optimality of σ. Hence no player is facing an ε-threat with respect to σ
at any round R, and this, coupled with the fact that σ is an ε-NE, yields that profile an
ε-TFNE.
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A One-way Functions and Commitment Schemes
A function f is one-way if it is easy to compute but hard to invert given the image of a
random input. More formally,
Definition A.1 (One-way functions) A function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is said to be one-
way if the following two conditions hold:
1. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that on input x outputs f(x).
2. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every polynomial p(·), and all
sufficiently large n’s
Pr
[
A(1n, f(Un)) ∈ f
−1(f(Un))
]
<
1
p(n)
,
where Un denotes the uniform distribution over {0, 1}
n.
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In this paper we also deal with one-way permutations, and we note that the above
definition naturally extends to consider permutations.
A commitment scheme is a two-stage interactive protocol between a sender and a re-
ceiver. After the first stage of the protocol, which is referred to as the commit stage, the
sender is bound to at most one value, not yet revealed to the receiver. In the second stage,
which is referred to as the reveal stage, the sender reveals its committed value to the receiver.
For simplicity of exposition, we will focus on bit-commitment schemes, i.e., commitment
schemes in which the committed value is only one bit. A bit-commitment scheme is defined
via a triplet of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing-machines (S,R,V) such that:
• S receives as input the security parameter 1n and a bit b. Following its interaction,
it outputs some information decom (the decommitment).
• R receives as input the security parameter 1n. Following its interaction, it outputs a
state information com (the commitment).
• V (acting as the receiver in the reveal stage8) receives as input the security parameter
1n, a commitment com and a decommitment decom. It outputs either a bit b′ or ⊥.
Denote by (decom|com) ← 〈S(1n, b),R(1n)〉 the experiment in which S and R interact
(using the given inputs and uniformly chosen random coins), and then S outputs decom
while R outputs com. It is required that for all n, every bit b, and every pair (decom|com)
that may be output by 〈S(1n, b),R(1n)〉, it holds that V(com, decom) = b.9
The security of a commitment scheme can be defined in two complementary ways,
protecting against either an all-powerful sender or an all-powerful receiver. The former are
referred to as statistically-binding commitment schemes, whereas the latter are referred to
as statistically-hiding commitment schemes. For simplicity, we assume that the associated
“error” is zero, resulting in perfectly-binding and perfectly-hiding commitments schemes.
In order to define the security properties of such schemes, we first introduce the following
notation. Given a commitment scheme (S,R,V) and a Turing machine R∗, we denote by
view〈S(b),R∗〉(1
n) the distribution of the view of R∗ when interacting with S(1n, b). This
view consists of R∗’s random coins and of the sequence of messages it receives from S. The
distribution is taken over the random coins of both S and R. Similarly, given a Turing
machine S∗ we denote by view〈S∗(1n),R〉(1
n) the view of S∗ when interacting with R(1n).
Note that whenever no computational restrictions are assumed on S∗ or R∗, then without
loss of generality they can be assumed to be deterministic.
Definition A.2 (Perfectly-binding commitment) A bit-commitment scheme (S,R,V)
is said to be perfectly-hiding if it satisfies the following two properties:
• Computational hiding: for every probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine R∗
the ensembles {view〈S(0),R∗〉(1
n)}n∈N and {view〈S(1),R∗〉(1
n)}n∈N are computationally
indistinguishable.
8Note that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the reveal stage is non-interactive. This is
since any such interactive stage can be replaced with a non-interactive one as follows: The sender sends its
internal state to the receiver, who then simulates the sender in the interactive stage.
9Although we assume perfect completeness, it is not essential for our results.
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• Perfect binding: for every Turing machine S∗
Pr
[
((decom, decom′)|com)← 〈S∗(1n),R(1n)〉 :
V(com, decom) = 0
V(com, decom′) = 1
]
= 0 ,
for all sufficiently large n, where the probability is taken over the random coins of R.
Perfectly-binding commitments can be constructed assuming the existence of any one-
way permutation [5]. The construction is “non-interactive,” meaning that the commitment
phase consists of a single message sent from the sender S to the receiver R.
Definition A.3 (Perfectly-hiding commitment) A bit-commitment scheme (S,R,V)
is said to be perfectly-hiding if it satisfies the following two properties:
• Perfect hiding: for every Turing machine R∗ the ensembles {view〈S(0),R∗〉(1
n)}n∈N
and {view〈S(1),R∗〉(1
n)}n∈N are identically distributed.
• Computational binding: for every probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine
S∗ the exists a negligible function µ(n) so that
Pr
[
((decom, decom′)|com)← 〈S∗(1n),R(1n)〉 :
V(com, decom) = 0
V(com, decom′) = 1
]
< µ(n) ,
for all sufficiently large n, where the probability is taken over the random coins of both
S∗ and R.
Perfectly-hiding commitments can be constructed assuming the existence of any one-way
permutation [24]. This construction is “highly-interactive,” in that the commitment phase
requires the exchange of n−1 messages between the sender and the receiver, where n is the
security parameter. By relaxing the hiding condition to be only “statistical” it is possible
to weaken the underlying assumption to the existence of one-way functions [12]. Assuming
the existence of collision resistant hash functions, it is possible to construct two-message
statistically-hiding commitments [25, 28].
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